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Key points: 
• Within the framework of the Lisbon Strategy launched in 2000, open methods of co
ordination (OMCs) have expanded to numerous fields of application, since a high degree of 
openness has made them an easily accessible instrument of EU policymaking. 
• The basic idea of open coordination – coordination rather than legislation; open to 
various actors, policies, and methods; transparent and open to the public – presents 
considerable opportunities for EU policymaking. 
• In light of an even more heterogeneous Union due to enlargement, and the need to search 
for new instruments beyond hard legislation in sensitive areas of national sovereignty, open 
coordination has the potential to develop into a complementary EU policymaking tool. 
• More than five years down the road, however, open coordination is still too ‘open’ to be a 
manageable instrument. The current hesitation of EU member states towards open co
ordination results primarily from the concept’s linguistic and conceptual vagueness. Thus, 
the most important challenge confronting open coordination involves the establishment of 
a common understanding of the concept as such. 
• The key to success lies in taming open coordination through six measures: clearly defining 
the overall objective of each respective OMC, developing a methodological tool to identify 
promising fields of application, enhancing member states’ commitment to the OMCs, 
making open coordination more democratic, respecting heterogeneity, and 
constitutionalising open coordination. 
 
One of Eurospeak’s recent stylistic howlers is the term ‘open method of coordination’. Open co
ordination has become a fashionable instrument in political practice as well as a subject for 
researchers all over Europe and the United States. But even amongst experts there is still no 
common understanding about what open coordination means, how it works and what its 
objectives are. Ask ten people, and you might get ten different answers. 
Since its official launch within the Lisbon Strategy in spring 2000, open coordination has 
expanded to numerous fields of application and can vary widely with regard to legal basis, 
procedures, and the actors involved. More than five years down the road, however, open co
ordination – which was presented as a method ‘designed to help the member states to 
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progressively develop their own policies’ in the March 2000 Presidency Conclusions – is too 
‘open’ in many ways, with significant consequences for its effectiveness: a concept that is so 
vague and malleable is difficult to translate into actual policymaking, especially within an 
already very complex system like the European Union. Thus, the most important challenge 
confronting open coordination involves the establishment of a common understanding of its 
objectives and main features. 
OMCs currently fall far short of providing a formalised and complete concept such as the 
community method. Rather, they can be described as a laboratory of integration. In this sense, 
open coordination offers a number of opportunities for the future of EU policymaking. In light of 
an even more heterogeneous Union due to enlargement, and the growing pressure to search for 
new instruments beyond hard legislation in sensitive areas of national sovereignty, open co
ordination has the potential to develop into a new policymaking tool complementing existing 
instruments of EU governance. 
This paper discusses the opportunities presented by open coordination as well as particular 
structural deficits that the existing OMCs have revealed over time, and proposes a number of 
strategies and measures for strengthening open coordination. 
 
1.  Opportunities of Open CoOrdination 
The basic idea of open coordination – coordination rather than legislation; open to various 
actors, policies, and methods; transparent and open to the public – provides the ground for a 
number of opportunities for EU policymaking: 
• No formal transfer of competencies: with OMCs, the member states are and continue to be 
free in their decisions concerning national policies. If there is political consensus amongst 
the member states, open coordination can be implemented without changing the 
distribution of competencies in the Treaties, which is always a politically sensitive issue.  
• Flexibility: Open coordination is a flexible instrument that can be extended pragmatically 
to various institutional settings and administrative procedures without requiring further 
elaboration in the Treaties. 
• Lower ‘threshold for participation’: OMCs were installed in policy areas where member 
states are not willing to give up further competencies to the EU, but nevertheless feel the 
need to cooperate more closely. Because open coordination lacks formal sanctions, 
member states’ resistance to further cooperation is reduced. 
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• A means to complement ‘hard’ economic integration: Since member states are and 
probably will remain reluctant to surrender further sovereignty in certain sensitive policy 
areas (such as Social Policy), open coordination can complement economic integration by  
providing an instrument for the further development of a European approach to Social 
Policy. 
• New instrument of governance: Open coordination can develop into a new instrument of 
multilevel governance, complementing the existing instruments of EU policymaking that are 
either intergovernmental or supranational, and enabling the EU and the member states to 
choose amongst a larger variety of governance instruments in the future. 
• Making learning a value in itself: Open coordination, a concept taken from the private 
sector, makes learning an integral part of the political process. This unique form of co
operation within the EU might prove to be a competitive advantage for the Union by 
effectively supporting member states on their way to becoming knowledgebased 
economies. 
• Dealing with diversity: Open coordination is an instrument that builds on diversity. 
Diversity is often perceived as an obstacle to EU policymaking rather than as an advantage. 
However, by aiming toward a convergence on the level of ideas rather than legal 
harmonisation, open coordination might demonstrate that the potential benefits of 
diversity have not been sufficiently exploited by the EU. 
 
2.  Deficits of Open CoOrdination 
Despite these positive aspects, the potential of open coordination remains underexploited. A 
number of horizontal aspects of open coordination require further discussion. The main 
problems of open coordination are: 
• No consensus on the overall objective of open coordination: What is the clear objective of 
a proposed OMC? Does a particular OMC seek to establish a process of policy learning or a 
process of policy coordination? What steps must be undertaken to reach this objective? 
The European Council was too vague on this issue. Consequently, a considerable number 
of problems have arisen during the planning and implementation of the various OMCs. 
• Criteria for potential fields of application missing: Currently, the main rationale for 
implementing an OMC in a specific policy area is connected to the distribution of 
competencies, i.e., OMCs can be established only where the EU does not have further 
legislative competencies. It is questionable whether this approach represents the best way 
to identify the most appropriate policy fields for instituting OMCs. Irrespective of the actual  
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distribution of competencies, which policy fields are most conducive to OMCs? What are 
the criteria for identifying suitable fields of application? 
• Lack of member states’ commitment to open coordination: OMCs are nonbinding and 
leave member states great room for manoeuvre in organising processes at the national and  
subnational levels. This flexibility allows participating member states to circumvent co
ordination processes or engage in OMCs as an exercise in symbolic politics. Furthermore, 
only a limited number of national officials are involved in peer reviews or the formulation of 
National Action Plans. As a result, the direct impact of open coordination at the national 
level is quite low. How can ownership of OMCs be improved? 
• Lack of democratic participation: OMCs currently exacerbate the democratic deficit of EU 
policymaking. They are in many ways bureaucratic exercises for European, national, and 
subnational administrations. Neither parliaments nor stakeholders are sufficiently involved, 
and the processes lack transparency. This type of governance is one of the reasons why EU 
citizens are dissatisfied with the Union’s policymaking. Is there a way to make the OMCs 
more democratic? 
• The obstacle of heterogeneity: The objective of enhancing member state ownership of the 
Lisbon process turned out to be highly ambitious. Among other factors, this has to do with 
different priorities among the EU25 member states regarding the three pillars of the 
Lisbon agenda (economic growth, social coherence, and environmental sustainability). 
Already diverse, the EU has become even more heterogeneous as a result of enlargement. 
Does this diversity present a significant obstacle to open coordination? Or is open co
ordination the key for coping effectively with this diversity? 
• NonConstitutionalisation of open coordination: Open coordination is not anchored in the 
Treaty of Nice as an official policymaking instrument. Part III of the Constitutional Treaty 
mentions the use of open coordination in certain current and potential fields of application 
but contains no horizontal article on open coordination. If the Constitution is ultimately 
ratified – an uncertain prospect at the moment – open coordination will enter 
constitutional law in a rather unsystematic way. If the Treaty of Nice continues to serve as 
the EU’s legal basis, OMCs will remain unmentioned in primary law. How could a 
horizontal article on open coordination look like?  
 
3.  Six Proposals for Taming Open CoOrdination 
While one of the main advantages of open coordination is its flexibility and ‘openness’, the 
above list of deficits reveals that this high degree of flexibility also presents an obstacle to open 
coordination. How can one tackle the deficits of open coordination without giving up its 
flexibility? The following section offers six proposals to meet this challenge. 
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3.1  Defining the overall objective of open coordination 
The objectives of open coordination are likely to vary depending upon the policy field addressed. 
The EU tried to respond to this problem by setting up different kinds of open coordination over 
time. But the European Council has remained too vague in its definitions, trying to bridge the 
different approaches and objectives of the member states in respective policy areas. This 
vagueness has turned into a burden for daily political practice: different understandings of the 
broad European Council definitions emerged within the EU bodies, leading to institutional 
rivalries and a diffusion of different practices. Therefore, from the very beginning, there should be 
a clear consensus, at the level of the European Council, on the objectives and procedures of each 
respective OMC. If the objective of an OMC is to promote a learning exercise for member states, 
a conceptual framework for policy learning must be developed. If the OMC’s goal is to co
ordinate policies, then the OMC must be set up to meet specific requirements of policy co
ordination. Defining an objective also involves identifying the most appropriate instrument to 
achieve this goal. This does not necessarily imply choosing open coordination. The community 
method or a mix of both might be an alternative (see section 3.2). 
 
3.2  Identifying potential fields of application 
From a strictly legal point of view, OMC processes can be established only where the EU does 
not have further legislative competencies. Supporters of the community method argue that if 
OMCs were applied in areas where the EU possesses legislative competencies, they would create 
a kind of legislation through the back door that would threaten the community method. 
However, the existing distribution of competencies should not be regarded as permanent. 
Consequently, it is important to think open coordination beyond the present division of 
competencies. 
What are promising fields of application? This question is closely related to the issue of defining 
the objectives of open coordination. One parameter for distinguishing among relevant policy 
fields is the existence of crossborder externalities or international spillover. There are policy 
areas with a strong potential for external spillover from one country to another, such as Research 
and Development, whereas others do not have strong direct effects on other member states. It is 
questionable if it makes sense to apply OMCs in areas possessing strong spillover potential, i.e., 
areas that could enhance EUwide competitiveness in the short or medium term, because open 
coordination is a relatively weak tool. Policy areas with strong potential for external spillover 
should be regulated within the framework of EU legislation rather than through open co
ordination. In contrast, areas with less potential for external effects fit better into OMC processes 
that support transnational learning in a longterm perspective. In contrast to the legalbased 
approach, this contentdriven approach to potential fields of application involves the 
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conceptualisation of OMCs beyond the policies covered by the Lisbon agenda, and beyond the 
actual division of competencies, since competencies might be questioned and transferred to 
OMCs and vice versa. 
 
3.3  Enhancing the member states’ commitment to open coordination 
There are three primary ways to improve the commitment of member states to OMCs: public 
pressure, formal constraints, and financial incentives. 
• Public pressure: Public pressure through the mechanism of naming and blaming has not 
been particularly effective in the OMCs launched thus far. One of the main reasons for this 
failure is the low profile of OMCs within national political processes: they fall within the 
purview of small circles of national administrations. The participation of concerned civil 
society organisations (e.g. in the social sector) depends on the goodwill of national 
governments. Participation of stakeholders varies amongst the member states, but in 
general stays on a low level. As a consequence, open coordination suffers from a lack of 
political, public and media attention. Lisbon is perceived as one of the many faceless, 
apolitical, technocratic, and complex EU processes that are difficult to communicate to a 
broader public. But as the ‘PISA shock’ proved, comparing national practices and publicly 
ranking them can actually put pressure on governments to undertake reforms in order to 
perform better. One cannot expect that this pressure will occur if OMCs remained relatively 
hidden within administrations. Public pressure can only grow if Lisbon receives greater 
attention within broader national as well as transnational debates. 
• Formal constraints: A second option involves the introduction of formal sanctions. This 
strategy would face a major hurdle, however: it is unlikely that member states would 
voluntarily introduce sanction mechanisms, and even if they did, the example of the 
Stability and Growth Pact has demonstrated that constraints can be handled quite loosely. 
Finally, since open coordination must be conducted primarily at the national level in order 
to function effectively, the sanction ‘stick’ should be handled carefully. 
• Financial incentives: As a third alternative, financial incentives could reinforce member 
state commitment to OMCs. The High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok suggested 
restructuring the EU budget according to the Lisbon priorities, in order to encourage 
member states to meet the Lisbon targets. But this requires a fundamental reform of the 
EU budget, which, in light of the compromise on the Financial Perspective 20072013 
agreed at the European Council in December 2005, is not in sight at the moment. 
Financing areas of open coordination will therefore be a highly difficult, though 
indispensable, task. 
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3.4  Making open coordination more democratic 
If open coordination is to become an official part of the EU policymaking toolbox in the long 
run, it must become more democratic. This can be achieved through greater transparency as well 
as the increased involvement of the European Parliament, national parliaments, and civil society 
organizations. 
• Transparency: OMCs are difficult to trace in EU and national policymaking processes 
because of their open, flexible, and multilevel character. Thus, information on all OMC 
processes should be systematically documented (legal basis, actors involved, measures 
taken and state of play) and made available to the public. The Commission, which already 
plays a coordinating and monitoring role, has the resources and independence to manage 
OMCs (by collecting data, conducting analysis, identifying best practices, and providing 
government and public access to relevant information). Within the Commission, there 
should be a clear delegation of responsibility for OMC management (‘Mr. OMC’). The 
Commission should develop an official OMC scoreboard (as is already provided, for 
example, by the Center for European Reform) and discuss it with both the media and 
involved actors on a regular basis. It would also help to develop new terminology for 
communicating the Lisbon Strategy: Open coordination is an expression that is both overly 
technical and confusing.  
• Involving Parliaments and civil society organizations: Strengthening parliamentary 
discussion of and participation in OMCs offers an additional avenue for making OMC 
processes more democratic. The Standing Committee that was established in the European 
Parliament during the Lisbon midterm review should be upgraded to the status of a 
Committee dealing horizontally with economic, social, and environmental questions. The 
EP should establish a plenary session on the Lisbon agenda before each Spring European 
Council and invite representatives of national parliaments to these debates. The 
participation of national parliaments should be enhanced by extending the Constitutional 
Treaty’s early warning mechanism to areas of open coordination. Involving civil society 
organizations more systematically in OMC processes would raise the awareness of the 
Lisbon Agenda amongst EU citizens. 
 
3.5  Dealing with heterogeneity through differentiation 
Open coordination is trapped in a dilemma: on the one hand, comparison and learning require a 
certain degree of diversity. On the other hand, an excessive diversity of preferences might hinder 
open coordination. Differentiated integration is a promising strategy in light of the growing 
diversity of an enlarged EU. Member states that share objectives and face similar problems in 
specific fields – e.g., because they possess similar social welfare systems – could decide to 
establish an OMC together. Limiting OMCs to smaller groups of member states would provide a  
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further benefit in that peer pressure works much better in groups of smaller size. OMC islands 
could develop within the EU, and additional third countries could be invited to participate. 
Combining open coordination and the concept of differentiated integration might thereby prove 
to be an important innovation within EU policymaking. 
 
3.6  Constitutionalising open coordination 
A horizontal provision on the instrument of open coordination would acknowledge existing 
OMC practice and make it more binding and transparent. To preserve the flexibility of open co
ordination, there should be no absolute, exclusive list of fields of application. Instead, a 
horizontal article should be formulated, that should delineate the key features of open co
ordination (a prototype OMC) from which diverse variations might develop according to the 
different requirements of respective policy fields. The article could broadly define open co
ordination as a mutual feedback process that is composed of elements to support learning; that 
includes executives and parliaments at the European, national, and subnational levels as well as 
stakeholders; that must be compatible with other requirements resulting from primary and 
secondary law and from EC policies; and that must respect the objectives of the Treaties. Details 
on the procedures could then be listed in a catalogue that might include the following 
components: 
• OMCs must be initiated by a formal decision of the European Council, and this decision 
must include a clear definition of the OMC and delegate the operational setup to the 
Commission and Council; 
• During the setup of an OMC, the Commission and Council must consult all concerned 
actors within the relevant policy field (including, e.g., the private sector and civil society) in 
order to develop suitable OMC objectives and processes; 
• The Commission must report systematically and regularly to the European Parliament and 
national parliaments; 
• OMC processes must be regularly documented and reviewed through transparent 
procedures managed by the Commission; these procedures should evaluate not only the 
outcome of the OMC but the OMC process itself; 
• The early warning mechanism must be applied to OMC processes (i.e., national parliaments 
and the European Court of Justice could be involved). 
This catalogue of measures would reduce the excessive ‘openness’ of current OMC processes 
and enhance the transparency and democratic legitimacy of open coordination. This clarification 
of procedures and principles would also affect decisionmakers’ perception of open co
ordination: having a clear road map (what you see is what you get) rather than a vague concept  
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that can be variably interpreted might enhance the commitment of member states to open co
ordination. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
Crossborder comparisons of national practices, as is performed within OMCs, are not new. But 
such comparisons go further within the EU context, because the Union offers a political 
framework that is lacking in other international arenas (e.g. the OECD). In that sense, the EU’s 
unique system can turn out to be a competitive advantage. So far, the history of open co
ordination has been very short, and the experience of a few years has probably revealed more 
weaknesses than positive results. In light of these performance deficits, open coordination 
certainly does not represent a policymaking panacea. The launch of the first OMC generation 
was characterised by a significant amount of randomness. Much progress remains to be made in 
making open coordination an effective instrument of governance. 
